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FIRST DAY         SECTION TWO 
 
 VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
 Roanoke, Virginia – July 26, 2011                                   
                                   
You MUST write your answers to Questions 6 and 7 in PURPLE Answer Booklet D 
 6. The Eagle Rock Land Company (“Eagle Rock”) has contracts to purchase four 
adjacent tracts of land in Botetourt County, Virginia.  Eagle Rock has obtained current title 
examinations of each parcel. All documents have been properly recorded. 
 
 Tract 1.  Fifteen years ago, Henry conveyed Tract 1 by a deed reciting, “I convey Tract 1 
to John for life, then to Ken for life, and then to Lucas.”  Five years ago, Lucas obtained a loan 
from Roscoe and gave Roscoe a deed of trust conveying all of his right, title and interest in Tract 
1 to a trustee as security for a promissory note payable to Roscoe.  Last year John and Ken died, 
and Lucas defaulted on the loan. Lucas contracted to sell Tract 1 to Eagle Rock.  In the 
meantime, Roscoe advertised a sale of the property under the terms of the deed of trust he holds, 
gave all required notices, and set the sale for 30 days from today. 
 
 Tract 2.  Ten years ago, Amelia conveyed Tract 2 to her children, Julia and Mary, as joint 
tenants.  Mary died five years ago and by her will left all of her property to a friend, Horace.  
Julia has contracted to sell Tract 2 to Eagle Rock, advising Eagle Rock that she and Mary had 
owned it with right of survivorship. 
  
Tract 3.  Thirty years ago, Dan conveyed Tract 3 by a deed reciting, “I convey Tract 3 to 
my son, Robert, for life, and upon his death, to Robert’s son, Junior.”  Recently Junior conveyed 
his interest to George by a deed, which recites, “I convey all of my right, title and interest in 
Tract 3 to George.”  Robert is still living.  George has contracted to sell Tract 3 to Eagle Rock. 
 
Tract 4.  Ten years ago, Carl conveyed Tract 4 by a deed reciting, “I convey Tract 4 to 
Sean and his heirs so long as Tract 4 is used solely for residential purposes.”  Five years ago, 
Sean built and has continually operated a garage for motorcycle repair on Tract 4.  Carl died last 
year and, in his will, he left his entire estate to his son, Jethro.  Jethro has contracted to sell Tract 
4 to Eagle Rock. 
 
Can the Eagle Rock Land Company acquire title to each of these tracts free of any 
other interests by purchasing the tracts at the present time from the persons who 
contracted to sell them?  Explain fully. 
 
Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #6 above in the PURPLE Booklet D 
 *  *  *  *  * 
 7. Riley Plumlee (“RP”), an adult resident of Fairfax County, Virginia, is the sole 
owner of a parcel of land, on which there was an unoccupied duplex dwelling, located in the City 
of Alexandria, Virginia (the “City”).  On January 3, 2011, the City issued a building permit to 
permit RP to repair damage to the dwelling caused by an accidental fire. 
 When the City conducted a routine inspection in early May, RP’s dwelling was observed 
with most of the roof missing, shattered brickwork, windows pulled loose from their frames, 
dangling electric wires at the point where the electrical utility service was connected to the 
house, and piles of dangerous debris strewn about. 
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 On May 5, 2011, RP received a letter by certified mail from the City, stating that the 
dwelling had been inspected and found to be “unsafe and a public nuisance” pursuant to certain 
cited provisions of the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code (“USBC”) and the Code of the 
City of Alexandria.  The letter directed RP to board-up and secure the dwelling by May 26, 2011, 
and to demolish the dwelling by June 5, 2011.  The letter also stated:  “Any owner who is 
aggrieved by the above decision may appeal pursuant to Section 106.5 of the USBC.  Such 
appeal must be filed in writing within 21 days of this notice.” 
 RP did not appeal, although he promptly retained an attorney and he met with City 
officials.  At the meeting, he promised to make certain repairs, which he started but did not 
complete. 
 On June 15, 2011, RP received a second certified mail letter from the City, advising that 
“the City will be demolishing the dwelling structure on your property under the emergency 
provisions of the USBC and that this is a continuum of the City’s May 5, 2011 action, declaring 
the structure to be ‘unsafe and a public nuisance.’”  On July 10, 2011, the City demolished the 
dwelling structure on RP’s land.  On July 20, 2011, without further communication with the 
City, RP filed in the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria a Complaint against the City, 
consisting of three counts: 
In Count 1, RP asserts that he was deprived of his federal procedural due process rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the City provided insufficient notice and opportunity to be heard 
before the demolition occurred.  Although RP acknowledges having received the May and June 
letters from the City, he argues that the notice was insufficient because the USBC requires that 
any notice of demolition be published in a newspaper of general circulation.  The City does not 
contest the publication requirement directly, but argues that RP – the sole owner – had actual 
notice in this case.    
In Count 2, RP pleads a common law negligence claim sounding in tort for property 
damages.   
In Count 3, RP asserts a state law claim for violations of his due process rights under 
Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution, alleging that the City had taken his property by 
inverse condemnation for public use without just compensation. 
How is the Circuit Court likely to analyze and decide: 
(a) Count 1 – federal procedural due process claim? Explain fully. 
(b) Count 2 – common law negligence claim for property damages?  Explain 
fully.  
(c) Count 3 – inverse condemnation claim?  Explain fully.  
 Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #7 above in the PURPLE Booklet D 
   
 *  *  *  *  * 
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  Now MOVE to the GREEN Answer Booklet E   
 
You MUST write your answer to Questions 8 and 9 in GREEN Answer Booklet E 
8. Waverly Lumber, Inc. (“Waverly”) was a supplier of lumber to construction 
companies in the Tidewater area of Virginia.  It entered into the following written contracts with 
companies with ongoing projects. 
 
Suffolk Builders (“Suffolk”) ordered 250 sheets of five-ply construction grade plywood 
to be delivered to a specified construction site.  Waverly’s driver made the delivery and 
deposited the load, at the direction of Suffolk’s foreman, just inside the chain-link fence 
surrounding the construction site.  Later in the day, Suffolk’s foreman realized that the plywood 
was three-ply, not the five-ply ordered.  He called Waverly and told them about the mistake, 
asked Waverly to deliver the requested five-ply and pick up the three-ply load first thing the next 
morning.  At the end of the day, Suffolk’s foreman pulled the chain-link gate shut, without 
locking it.  That night, some neighborhood children frequently seen playing in the construction 
site after hours entered the site, took 15 sheets of the plywood and used it to make a skateboard 
ramp.  Waverly delivered the five-ply shipment, picked up the remaining 235 sheets of three-ply, 
and added the cost of the 15 missing sheets to Suffolk’s bill.  Suffolk refused to pay for the 
missing sheets, asserting that but for Waverly’s misdelivery, the plywood would have been 
moved and used on the site the day before. 
 
Tidewater Building Contractors (“Tidewater”) ordered 525 kiln-dried floor joists cut into 
12-foot lengths and delivered to Tidewater’s building site.  Waverly made the delivery, and soon 
after the joists were unloaded and the driver left, Tidewater’s building superintendent discovered 
that a large number of them appeared to be “green” and not properly dried.  He immediately 
called Waverly, reported the discovery, and told Waverly to come pick up the joists and replace 
them with ones that were properly dried.  Waverly informed Tidewater’s superintendent that 
kiln-dried joists were currently in short supply and that Tidewater would have to wait for a week 
to get replacements.  After talking to Waverly, but without telling Waverly, Tidewater’s 
superintendent concluded that 400 of the joists were dry enough and that he could use them. 
 
 In the meantime, Waverly sold those same 525 joists at a substantial premium to another 
builder who was willing to take them as is.  When Waverly’s driver showed up the next morning 
to pick up the “green” joists, Tidewater’s superintendent said he would return only the 125 that 
he could not use.  Waverly insisted that it was entitled to the return of the entire shipment of 525. 
Tidewater insisted that it was entitled to reject part of the shipment and keep the balance. 
 
(a) What are the rights and obligations of Waverly and Suffolk with regard 
 to the 15 missing sheets of plywood?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) What are the rights and obligations of Waverly and Tidewater with regard to 
the 525 floor joists? Explain fully. 
 
Reminder: You MUST answer Question #8 above in GREEN Answer Booklet E 
*  *  *  *  * 




 9. Cameron Cabel was recently fired from her job at Beneficial Bank, a Virginia 
Corporation, (“Beneficial”) in Richmond, Virginia, allegedly for "poor performance."  However, 
Ms. Cabel believes the reason she was fired is that she had resisted the sexual advances of her 
supervisor.  She retained Larry Lawson, a member of the Virginia State Bar and a solo 
practitioner in Ashland, Virginia, to represent her in a suit for sexual harassment against 
Beneficial.  Beneficial is represented in all business and litigation matters by a large law firm in 
Richmond. 
 
Cameron told Larry that Riley Ray, an executive vice president of Beneficial, who 
happens to be a good friend of Cameron’s father, knows about other accusations of sexual 
harassment against her supervisor.  She said that Mr. Ray would probably be willing to talk “off 
the record” with Larry.  
 
Maddie, a close friend of Cameron who works as a clerk for Beneficial, told Cameron 
that she has knowledge of two earlier investigations into allegations that Cameron’s supervisor 
had sexually harassed other female employees.  However, Maddie was reluctant to help Cameron 
by “going public” with the information for fear that Beneficial would retaliate against her.  
Cameron reported Maddie’s revelation to Larry.  
  
Larry would like to interview both Riley Ray and Maddie separately and ex parte, 
without disclosing the interviews to Beneficial’s attorneys. 
 
Are there any restrictions in the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct that 
prevent Larry from conducting either of these ex parte interviews or that impose 
any obligations on him before conducting either of them?  Explain fully. 
 
Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #9 above in GREEN Answer Booklet E 
 *  *  *  *  * 
 Proceed to the short answer questions in Booklet F - (the PINK Booklet). 
 
  
  
 
